Participatory Investments by Banks: A Structural Problem of the Universal Banking System in Germany by Immenga, Ulrich
Journal of Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 2 (1979) 29-48
a North-Holland Publishing Company
PARTICIPATORY INVESTMENTS BY BANKS: A STRUCTURAL PROBLEM
OF THE UNIVERSAL BANKING SYSTEM IN GERMANY
ULRICH IMMENGA *
Discussions concerning the structure of the German banking system have been
intense in recent years, principally at the political level but also among scholars. A
major expression of this interest has been the nomination of a study commission on
"Fundamental Questions of the Credit Industry", by the Federal Ministry of
Finance in 1974. This commission's charge is to investigate the universal banking
system that prevails in Germany. An especially important aspect of that system is
the increasing practice of banks to invest in the shares of companies in the indus-
trial and commercial sectors. A further problem arises from the practice in
Germany whereby small shareholders give to banks their proxies for the general
meeting; indeed, the majority of the shares of German companies are deposited in
banks [I]. In addition, there is a close link between banks and industry through
personnel interlocks; this is due to the membership on supervisory boards, since
German law separates management and supervisory functions.
In Germany these matters that the commission will investigate are frequently the
basis for slogans about the "power of the banks" [2]. In addition, consideration
will probably be given to reforming the rules for the equity capitalization of the
banks. The universal banking system as such will not be questioned. A separation
system is not politically feasible, especially in the light of the trend to universaliza-
tion in other countries [3]. Questions about proxy voting through banks (the
so-called Depotstimmrecht or depository vote), as well as personnel interlocks,
could more easily be answered by corporation law, but here, too, no decisive
changes should be expected. The strength of the depository vote is the lack of a
realistic alternative. The proxy system practiced in other countries can scarcely find
support in Germany, since it affords no appreciable control over the organs of
management [4]. According to press reports it is very likely that there will be a
recommendation by the study commission restricting banks in their participation in
the non-banking sector.
The banks' activities in share holdings will be discussed in this article as a struc-
tural problem of the German banking economy. Aside from the interest of the
study commission in this question, there is an additional reason for considering it at
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this time. The Monopolies Commission, in its first report in 1976, proposed a
drastic restriction on participations to 5% of the capital of any one company [5].
The Monopolies Commission is charged by the antitrust law [6] to look into the
concentration of enterprises and to appraise the efficacy of regulations concerning
mergers and market abuse by dominant firms. The commission's report contains an
abundance of material about banks and concentration [7] that will be referred to in
this article.
1. Bank participations in Germany: law and practice
A. The legal background
In Germany, bank participation is not regulated directly by law. Bank participa-
tory holdings, together with other long-term investments, are restricted only by
Section 12 of the Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz). Under this section, a credit
institution may hold investments in real estate, buildings, ships, and shares, the total
book value of which does not exceed its capital and reserves. Participations are also
encompassed indirectly within the so-called "Principles of Equity Capital and
Liquidity" promulgated by the Federal Supervisory Agency for Banking [8]. How-
ever, these norms neither lead to a limitation on participations nor reveal their
extent. Participations through shareholdings are aggregated with the other invest-
ments mentioned above, in a single account. Furthermore, the concept of participa-
tion has not yet been adequately defined. In practice, the entries under the term
"participatory holdings" are generally limited to interests in other banks or in com-
panies in the near-banking sector (such as property management, leasing and invest-
ment advisory companies). In contrast, holdings in enterprises in non-banking sec-
tors exceeding 10% of the capital of a joint stock company are normally not
entered on the balance sheet as "participations" but as "securities" [9]. This
accounting practice has scarcely been changed by the directives for the preparation
of the annual accounts of banks [10]. According to these directives, in case of
doubt, shares in a stock company are presumed to be participations if they amount
to 25% of capital [11]. Thus, at least the larger holdings are supposed to be shown
as "participations", but this presumption can be negatived by an assertion that no
participation was "intended". The banks usually disavow this intention by indicat-
ing that in the past their participations have not served to exert an entrepreneurial
influence, i.e., the banks have not pursued a policy of being directly active in the
business affairs of the companies whose shares they hold.
Recently the question of accounting for bank participations has been the subject
of intensive discussion between the Federal Supervisory Agency for Banking and
the Institute of Chartered Accountants [12]. The debate has dealt with the identifi-
cation of criteria for determining when the holding of shares amounts to participa-
tion. However, a definitive solution to this problem has not yet been found.
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B. Participation in practice
The legal situation described above makes it virtually impossible to provide sta-
tistical data about bank participation in the non-banking sector. For this, reference
can be made only to an early "Inquiry into Concentration" [13], covering a period
up to the end of 1960. In its first report, the Monopolies Commission updated
essential parts of the inquiry to the end of 1974, the year of the commission's
establishment. However, only limited conclusions can be drawn from the available
data [14]. According to the report, banks held only about 3.2% of the share capital
of all non-banking corporations. However, it should be noted that even with a wide
distribution of participations in industry as a whole, concentrations of capital were
found in certain sectors and, within these, in important enterprises. Thus there was
potential for banking influence over a few, but important, branches of the econ-
omy.
The position of the three leading banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and
Commerzbank) is significant in this context. In 1960 they held two-thirds of the
face value of all participations; 69% of their participations were in only ten enter-
prises. The concentrations inquiry revealed an increase in the volume of participa-
tions; this increase has not slackened. For the year 1970 the German Central Bank
estimated that from 5 to 7% of the capital of German corporations was held by
banks (as their own assets, as distinguished from shares held by them as deposito-
ries) [15]. The potential for the exercise of influence over the economy by banks
through participations cannot be adequately quantified, even in the light of the
figures given here. That potential must be viewed in the context of the proxy voting
right acquired by German banks with respect to shares deposited with them by
their customers. To this should be added the links with investment companies
which, in general, are dependent upon the banks. This relationship and its effects
will be discussed later.
2. Motives for bank participation
The connection between current banking business and long-term participation in
enterprises in other branches of the economy is not obvious. Normal banking busi-
ness consists of facilitating investments, lending money and transferring funds.
Acquiring participations has therefore been described as an "alien" activity [16].
What are the reasons behind this policy?
A. Unplanned participations
Participations are not always the result of a planned investment policy. But
banks acquire participations frequently in the course of normal banking trans-
actions. These latter participations should be viewed in the framework of general
banking policy.
A bank's taking part in the business of share flotation by other enterprises can
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lead to its acquisition of a participatory interest. Usually when banks become
involved in the flotation of a new issue they take a fixed allotment of shares
through subscription and thereafter place them on the capital market at their own
risk. In practice several banks share the risk of a single issue by forming a syndicate.
The assumption of this market risk is an important aspect of the business of issuing
shares of which account is taken in setting the banks' underwriting compensation.
If there is insufficient demand in the capital market the members of tile under-
writing syndicate must take their allotment into their own portfolios. The total
volume of participations that arise in this way is normally relatively small [17].
This is because, although the market risk is highest when shares are issued in con-
nection with the founding of a company, the most frequent occasions for the
issuing of shares in Germany involve the increase of capital by seasoned firms. In
such cases, the standing of the issuer is already known, the amounts to be placed
are frequently small and thus, with the sharing of the decreased risk by the mem-
bers of the syndicate, the volume of unsold shares that each bank must take up is
not large.
In addition to acquiring participations as a consequence of their involvement
with the issuing of shares, banks also acquire participations in the operation of their
credit business [18]. Especially in the field of industrial finance, banks are not
always able to collect the loans they have made. The bank is usually neither willing
nor able to extend the maturity date of such loans. If the enterprise cannot pay off
the loan in cash, the bank may accept settlement in the borrower's bonds or shares.
In such cases the bank may end up as the owner of these new securities, especially
if they cannot be disposed of by the bank on the capital market. This typically is
the case when the debtor company is in financial difficulties since the market is
understandably unwilling to invest in such a company. Thus the bank's participa-
tion emanates from its normal business of advancing credit. Of course, share partici-
pations acquired in this fashion give the banks membership rights under company
law and a consequent ability to exert influence in the making of business decisions
in the reorganized company. This influence is frequently realized by the assumption
of a position in the company's supervisory board. The bank then cooperates in
finding solutions to personnel and financial problems in an effort to restore the sol-
vency of the company. This influence can on occasion be used to reorganize the
company by combining it with a stronger partner.
B. Planned investment policy
Unplanned participations are the outcome of the operation of normal banking
business. They thus serve the bank's profit-making goals indirectly. But in the
German universal banking system profits are also sought directly through pur-
chase of shares. In such cases participations are acquired as the result of planned
investment policy [19]. Banks will enter into this line of business if their credit
potential is not exhausted. In such circumstances there exist incentives to diver-
sify into securities. It should be stressed that banks are in an especially favorable
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol2/iss1/2
U. linmenga /Participatory investments by banks
position in comparison with other institutional investors. The latter must pay
"brokerage" commissions when investing in securities, whereas banks can make
relatively costless use of their own brokerage networks in making their own invest-
ments. Furthermore, the value of the banks' proximity to the market should not be
underestimated. Their activity in the securities business develops an expertise that
leads to the acquisition of information about companies and about the securities
markets, information that is useful not only for their customers but also for their
own business dealings.
From the banks' roles as lenders and underwriters, as well as through their repre-
sentation on supervisory boards, they are in a special position to acquire inside
information about businesses, information not known to the general public. This
information can be valuable in connection with trading in shares. In Germany
insider trading is not yet prohibited or otherwise regulated by law. A system of
voluntary self-regulation does exist [20], but it is not considered very efficient
[211. Therefore, under the present legal situation, it should not be assumed that
every opportunity to use inside information in their dealings on the securities
market has been taken away from the banks.
Planned investment policy serves the purpose of stabilizing profits. Banks expect
the continuous receipt of dividends and, even more, increases in the value of the
corporate shares acquired. The latter can also be viewed as a shield against inflation.
Furthermore, like the various segments of the diversified universal banking system
generally, securities participations are an important factor in risk distribution [22].
C. Trading in participatory blocks
Frequently participations are created or acquired not so much to serve as long-
term financial investments but rather to meet the transitory needs of a flexible
capital market. In such situations, blocks of shares are themselves the subject of
trade. When new groups of companies are formed, when joint ventures are created
or split up, when property passes by inheritance, or when other changes in business
relationships are contemplated, it frequently becomes necessary for a strong finan-
cial institution to step in and help develop a constructive solution to a business
problem of this type, such as to put together participations, hold them temporarily
and then sell out [23]. Banks are sometimes instrumental in special situations of
this type designed to ward off the influence of foreign capital [24]. A bank may
enter into such a transaction as a half-way house in connection with its activities in
corporate finance or as a corporate consultant. In countries where banking is organ-
ized under the separation system, these same functions are undertaken by invest-
ment banks.
D. Participations as devices to cement business relationships
Although the banks do not make a point of it, there are weighty arguments that
banks' participation policy is aimed at extending the market for their services and
cementing the resulting business relationships [25]. This has been confirmed by the
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investigations of the Monopolies Commission [26]. As previously mentioned, the
banks have tended to participate rather heavily in just a few branches of the econ-
omy. This phenomenon can hardly be explained except by the reason just stated,
unless these participations are unplanned. The participations acquired in these few
areas of business cannot be attributed to any superior profitability and quality of
the companies invested in, since no such superiority exists [27]. It is therefore
probable that such planned participations are predominantly related to the banks'
interest in intensifying their business relationships with the companies whose securi-
ties are acquired. This perception of the banks' interest is also consistent with their
thesis that they have not used their participations to pursue a policy of controlling
the underlying companies. Thus these acquisitions reflect normal banking business
policy.
The voting power that a bank can exercise as a shareholder under company lav
may influence business decisions concerning relations of the bank with the com-'
pany. This is even more likely if the bank can buttress its own voting power by the
exercise of proxies to vote shares deposited with it by customers or by its strong
position as a creditor of the company.
As a shareholder with such influence the bank can solidify its relation to a com-
pany with respect to credit and other banking needs; it can draw lucrative foreign
business into its sphere. In connection with a company's issuing shares, tie partici-
pating shareholder-bank can expect to serve as a member of the underwriting syn-
dicate and can secure for itself a favorable allotment of the shares being issued. In
short, the spectrum of services offered by the universal bank can be brought into
play; the company within the bank's sphere of influence is put into the service of
the bank's general business policy [281.
E. Conclusions
This sketch has shown that bank participation in other branches of the economy
can always be viewed in connection with the entrepreneurial goals of the banking
industry. To the extent that participations are not directly profit-oriented invest-
ments, they are the outgrowth of the performance of normal banking tasks: under-
writing the flotation of shares, collection of loans, corporate consulting and corpo-
rate finance. They serve also to increase and cement business relationships. When
dealing in shares or blocks of shares, banks claim to be exercising a public welfare
function, Le., the maintenance of a flexible capital market. Although the perfor-
mance of this function cannot be denied, it is somewhat a background factor and
must be viewed as accessory to more general business activities. In any event,
market transactions in share participations as such justify the holding of only tem-
porary participations [29].
The question remains whether the participatory investments should be con-
sidered an essential element in the ability of a bank (and indeed of the banking sys-
tem as a whole) to perform as an efficient economic unit, i.e., to maintain profit-
ability and stabilize risk as well as to provide security from inflation for its invest-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol2/iss1/2
U. Inrmenga / Participatory investments by banks
ments [301. A conclusive statement seems to be impossible. The Monopolies Com-
mission has legitimately indicated that similar questions might be asked with
respect to enterprises in other branches of the economy besides banking. The
banks' economic objectives could be accomplished more readily with a large num-
ber of smaller participations; the efficiency of the capital market would also be
increased [31]. Moreover, if one looks at the low dividend yield from participations
and notes that non-German banking systems maintain their efficiency despite a
comparatively small holding of participations, it cannot be said that participations
are of primary importance in the banking business as a whole.
The reasons that have been given for the present volume of participations do not
render moot a discussion of their legitimacy [32]. The matter finally comes down
to an analysis of the consequences that flow from their existence.
By bringing influence to bear on companies, participations serve to intensify
business relationships. Beyond holding participations, banks have other ways of
exercising influence, as indicated in the next part of this article. In Part 4, the ques-
tion will be asked: what are the effects of participations on the companies con-
cerned, on inter-banking competition and on other markets? Finally, in Part 5, the
effects of participation will be looked at from the standpoint of the protection of
depositors.
3. Participations and other possibilities for banks' influence on enterprises in the
non-banking area
In Germany banks and business enterprises are connected not just through
deposit and credit transactions or the bank ownership of participations; three other
phenomena creating such relationships are discussed hereafter: influence through
proxy voting, connections between banks and investment companies, and personnel
interlocks.
A. Influence through ownership of shares
Direct influence on business decisions can be exerted through shareholder voting
only if the shareholders can command the majorities required by company law.
Banks hold these majorities through participations only in exceptional cases [33].
But there are occasions when a holder of a block of shares can veto a company's
decision that, under the law, requires a qualified majority. In these cases, the bank's
assent to a certain decision (e.g., a capital increase) may be bargained for by the
company with concessions to the bank in other areas.
B. Bank-connected investment companies
To the extent that, as is usual in Germany, a bank controls an investment com-
pany, the bank's voting influence on an enterprise whose shares are owned by the
investment company can be strengthened [34]. But the bank will not always have
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the controlling influence on the investment company [35]. Furthermore, under
German law not more than 5% of the capital of an investment company (open-end
fund) may be invested in the shares of any one enterprise and not more than 5% of
the capital of any one enterprise may be acquired by an investment company [36].
Voting influence through a bank's connection with investment companies is there-
fore relatively slight, although it should not be totally disregarded.
C. Proxy voting (the depository vote)
In Germany the banks' proxy vote is common practice. It is the banks that cast
the votes of the many small individual shareholders in the general meetings of
public corporations, votes that otherwise would not be exercised. This constitutes
an important difference from the general practice in other countries (Italy excepted)
of allowing otherwise neglected votes to be cast by the management itself or by
groups opposed to management [37].
The right of proxy voting by German banks is related to their custodial business.
Certificates for shares, especially of small shareholders, are typically not delivered
to the purchasers but are deposited in the custody of banks. Therefore the resulting
voting right acquired by the banks is described as a depository voting right (Depot-
stirnmrecht). The ability to exercise the vote of the depositing customer is provided
by the corporation law (§ 135 Aktiengesetz). To exercise this right the bank makes
its own proposals known to the shareholder and asks for instruction. As far as no
instructions are given, the bank can vote in accordance with its own proposals. If
new points of view arise in the general meeting, the bank can deviate from its pro-
posals if it can conclude that the shareholder, with knowledge of the situation,
would have concurred in the deviation.
This regulation is supposed to guarantee that the proxy will be used in general
meetings for the benefit of the bank's deposit customers rather than for the bank
itself. The shareholder's right to give instructions should preserve a genuine repre-
sentation of his interests [38]. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that this proxy
right can, at least in part, add to the banks' influence. The opportunity to give
instructions will be used by only a small percentage of the shareholders to whom
the bank writes at any time. A recent survey disclosed that instructions were
given in only 350 instances out of 300,000 communications to customers [39].
Whether one views this response as silent acquiescence in the banks' proposals or as
evidence of the passivity of the small shareholder - which appears more likely -
the exercise of the proxy certainly does not foreclose bank influence [40]. In any
case, it can safely be asserted that the interests of the bank and the shareholders are
frequently parallel and that conflicts arise only under certain circumstances [41].
It is not possible to qualify the real influence exercised through the proxy right.
However, the quantitative importance of the representation of the small share-
holder by proxy can be discerned to a certain degree. No exact figures are on hand
[42] but it appears that approximately 50% of the shares in German companies
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(other than insurance companies) are in bank custody [43]. If bank ownership of
shares of about 7.5% is added to that, there exists a potential voting power of
almost 60% in the hands of the banks. The significance of this percentage is further
underlined by the fact that in Germany the average attendance at general meetings
ranges from only 70% to 80% [441. Of course, at any one general meeting the
proxy right will usually be exercised by several banks, which has the effect of dis-
persing the potential for influence.
The proxy voting right of the banks is a matter of continual discussion, most of
which is critical [45]. The bank's influence resulting from its exercise cannot be
denied. This is a structural problem for all corporations with a large body of share-
holders. As long as votes are not exercised by the owners themselves, but through
third parties, there exists a potential danger to the interests of the small share-
holder. Consequently it has been proposed by some German legal writers that the
voting right should be abolished and that there be a contemporaneous increase in
management's fiduciary duty [461. This proposal, however, has next to no prospect
of being realized. The proxy voting right as such is not seriously in question.
D. Personnel interlocks
Banks are represented on the supervisory organs of corporations to a very great
extent. According to the investigations of the Monopolies Commission, this is true
for at least one-third of the companies, 28% of whose supervisory board members
are bank representatives [471. Of course there is a question whether this is a factor
of influence additional to those already existing, since such representation is chiefly
evidence of the influence that can be exercised through voting or as an outgrowth
of credit connections. Nor should this representation necessarily be viewed as an
unwelcome intrusion by banks into the affairs of enterprises, since the enterprises
themselves are interested in bank representation: bank representatives provide
expert advice and help to strengthen credit relationships. However, it should be
appreciated that in this way banks enlarge their opportunities for acquiring infor-
mation about the financial affairs and business policies of the companies concerned.
4. Effects of the banks' influence
The factors mentioned above indicate that there is a potential for bank influence
that cannot be considered negligible. The various means for influencing the deci-
sion-making process cannot be measured quantitatively; the possibility of com-
bining the several factors would preclude this. But participation by banks can at
least be described as playing a considerable role.
What are the effects that emanate from this potential for influence? The answer
to this question is important in assessing the legitimacy of bank participation. There
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may be effects on the enterprises in which participations are held as well as on com-
petitive conditions in several markets.
A. Effects on the enteiprise itself
The interests of an enterprise may be adversely affected in some measure when
security is given for bank loans. If the bank is in a strong position it may insist on
excessive security for an extension of credit; this may interfere unduly with subse-
quent business activities.
More serious problems are caused by the potential conflict of interests between
bank and enterprise in the field of long-term financing. As legal writers have
pointed out, even though an increase in the capital of an enterprise might be war-
ranted, a bank might be inclined to press the enterprise to meet its financial needs
by short-term credits, in view of better prospects for bank profits from its loan
business [48]. Such action by a bank can endanger the soundness of a corporation's
financial structure and lead to undercapitalization. This has led to the macro-
economic criticism that the securities market has been neglected because of the
influence of universal banks [49]. However, one can view this situation in general
only as a potential danger, since it is doubtful that a bank can force an inappro-
priate means of financing upon a corporation with growth potential and the capa-
bility of issuing long-term securities.
In addition, it is possible that the voting power of banks being represented on
corporate governing bodies may impede efficient control of these bodies. This
could have an adverse effect on company interests when, for example, the bank
promotes the adoption of a resolution discharging its representatives from liability
or urges the payment of unreasonably high compensation.
B. Market effects
Stock participations by banks may restrain competition between banks as well as
between the corporations that are the subject of participation. These effects are the
Monopolies Commission's concern and led to proposal for new regulations [50].
The significance of participations with respect to inter-bank competition is par-
ticularly apparent and has been recognized for a long time [51]. As mentioned
above, as a shareholder the bank can establish and secure a position for itself as a
house bank. The investigations of the Monopolies Commission revealed easier access
to lucrative membership in syndicates and to foreign business [52]. In sum, com-
petitive advantages are derived from share participations to a certain extent.
This tendency toward impeding inter-bank competition through participations
requires a harmonization throughout the European Community, since otherwise an
integrated market for banking services cannot be established. This means that
cemented bank-customer relationships will prevent effective competition from
foreign banks [53].
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But this picture may be overdrawn. Existing inter-bank competition has already
set limits to the ability of banks to freeze business relations even with enterprises
in which they hold participations. No company will have to fully succumb to a
bank even if it is its most important shareholder. A significant factor leading to this
conclusion is the increasing competition in Germany between private commercial
banks, on one hand, and the savings and state banks established under public law,
on the other [54]. Another limit to the banks' influence can be found in the finan-
cial emancipation of companies that results from their use of internal financing
through earned surplus or from establishing their own banks.
Finally, there is the question of the somewhat less visible effect of bank partici-
pations on competition among the enterprises that are subject to such participa-
tions. It has been commonly accepted that banks do not use their shareholdings to
set the business policies of those enterprises [55]. However, there is no institutional
guarantee of this self-restraint. Deviations from this policy might occur if a bank
tries to improve its position as a shareholder by means of restricting competitive
market forces.
The Monopolies Commission pointed out that banks just being shareholders
cannot do otherwise than participate in making significant entrepreneurial decisions
in the companies they hold, particularly those concerning investments and finance;
in these cases information concerning the competitive conditions of the enterprises
in which they hold shares becomes part of the decision-making process [56].
Beyond these effects on competition, in some instances in Germany it has
become apparent that participation by banks impedes the making of rational
decisions in the market for corporate control [57]. The functioning of this market
depends on an undisturbed balancing of supply and demand, particularly in merg-
ers, sales of blocks of controlling shares and the formation of company groups. This
process requires that independent decisions be made by the opposing parties to a
negotiation and that they be focused on the economic success of the acquisition.
This pre-condition is no longer fulfilled once a single bank or several cooperating
banks, using their influence over several companies, force a combination. In such
a case, it is no longer the economic rationality of a market composed of com-
peting interests that governs these mergers.
C. Conclusions
As this sketch has indicated, bank participation in non-banking enterprises
creates distinct risks for these enterprises, for the existence of undistorted inter-
bank competition and for the functioning of the market for enterprises themselves.
General provisions of law directed against corporate and market control cannot pre-
vent these effects. The German law on company systems (Konzernrecht), codified
in the Federal Corporation Law (Aktiengesetz) since 1965, contains some provi-
sions to check defacto influence over a corporation [58]. However, it is not easy to
prove "control" [59], since the banks' potential to compel the making of decisions
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rests on different factors. Also, their influence can become effective even below the
threshold set by the statute. Finally, it must be noted that the statutory limits are
designed to be drawn against entrepreneurial influence and are therefore hardly
fitted to rule banking relations.
Using the antitrust laws to govern the effects of bank participations is beset with
extraordinary problems. Only in exceptional cases will there exist either unlawful
conscious parallel action or the ability to prove it [60]. Control of excessive con-
centration begins only where dominating positions are either created or strength-
ened [61]; participatory investments will generally not be qualified under this
standard.
Since general antitrust law forms only limited barriers, it seems an obvious step
to deal with the risks arising from bank participations by regulating them directly.
The Monopolies Commission argues that this step should be taken, but solely
because of the effects of participations on competition. The commission stresses
the fact that the positive effects of concentration that are present in other cases
(e.g., rationalization and economies of scale) simply do not exist where banks
engage in participations that are not focused on the near-banking sector. The major-
ity of the commission asserts that there should be a limit of 5% on the acquisition
of the capital stock of any one corporation [62]. Before a position on this limita-
tion is taken in this article, there are problems with respect to the protection of
depositors that must be examined. It is precisely because of these considerations
that other countries have put limits on bank participations [63].
5. Bank participations and the protection of depositors
Deposits are entrusted to banks for only limited periods; in order to safeguard
them against losses a bank has to try to reduce the risks connected with its business
activities. Furthermore, repayment of deposits on the date they are due must be
guaranteed. These risks, concerning security and liquidity as principal goals of
banking policy, are incurred by participatory investments.
A. The security risk
Whenever banks invest clients' funds in shares or stock, a substantial risk of loss
arises. Losses may be realized as a result of incompetent management, an economic
crisis in the particular sector or a general fall in share prices. It is practically impos-
sible to spread this risk; banks can take steps through their representation on super-
visory boards only against mismanagement.
The security risk is increased when a bank ties itself too closely to the success or
failure of any one enterprise by way of a substantial participation. If business goes
bad and the value of the participation falls, it seems a natural step for the bank to
help the enterprise by generously extending credit. In this case losses from partici-
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pation will be increased by losses in the credit sector. As a preventive measure diver-
sification to the greatest possible extent can reduce the security risk, even if it
cannot do away with it completely. For this reason it seems appropriate to set
limits to the acquisition of the shares of any one company.
B. The liquidity risk
The importance of the banks' continual readiness to pay depositors on demand
leads to the question of the relationship between participations and the banks'
equity. Participations cannot be considered liquid assets; the latter are characterized
by the fact that they can be transformed into cash at any time, without discount.
That is not the case with shares, for several reasons. Although participations are not
"due" at any time, so that they can be used at the banks' entrepreneurial discre-
tion, this discretion is subject to the influence of outside factors. Frequently there
is no market for the shares. This can be true for closely-held corporations or for
those whose shares have never been listed on an exchange. Even if the shares can be
sold on an exchange, it should be noted that sale of a substantial block may lead to a
fall in share prices. In addition, the time at which a sale is necessary might be quite
unfavorable in view of the then current price of the particular shares.
From the German point of view, because of the time lags that interfere with
ready sale of participations and their potential lack of marketability, participations
are considered fairly non-liquid [64]. Therefore the only funds that qualify for par-
ticipations are those that are not subject to immediate repayment or to repayment
after a short period of time. It can be argued that only a bank's own capital assets
should be used to acquire participations.
6. Effects on the capital market
The following will only summarize the significance that bank participations play
in the capital market. In the discussion, earlier in this article, of the banks' motives
for acquiring participations, attention was drawn to their present relationships with
the capital market [65]. The banks' role as intermediary in the issuing of shares by
companies is to facilitate effective public placement. They take the capacity of the
market into consideration and through stabilization techniques are able to prevent
undue price fluctuations until an orderly market for the particular security has
come into being [66].
In this connection banks also perform a "mobilizing" role. They contribute to a
process in which medium and long-term credit can be refinanced with equity
capital. This contributes to the formation of capital by enterprises [67].
In comparison with other enterprises, banks have a particularly strong capacity
to trade shares after collecting them into blocks. This increases the flexibility and
depth of the capital market. This is particularly true in Germany, where other insti-
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tutional investors do not play the role they play in other countries. In general,
banks' securities activities form a link between small investors (savers) and com-
panies that seek to broaden their capital base. To a certain degree, insurance com-
panies and pension funds are assuming this function, too.
7. Evaluation
At the present time the practice of German universal banks to acquire shares in
the non-banking sector is subject to widespread criticisa. Unless one is satisfied to
view the question of participations in a sweeping and unreflective manner, such as
under the catchwords "power of the banks", the factors mentioned above should
be decisive in the search for a solution. As far as discussions on a political level are
concerned, there is little attention given to the relationship between share partici-
pation and depositors' protection from the standpoint of security risks and
liquidity risks. This is perhaps because the aspect of "power" does not play a role
in evaluating these risks and because there have been no spectacular events involving
the realization of those risks. It becomes more and more apparent, however, that
criticism is being directed toward the influence of banks over enterprises, including
the practice of share participations.
However, there are positive aspects of share participations that should not be
neglected when considering negative effects on enterprises, markets and depositors.
As already mentioned, motives for acquisitions that are merely accessory to normal
banking business cannot serve as fundamental justifications for the acquisition of
share participations. The same is true for the potential of participations as sup-
portive elements of an efficient capital market. Without doubt banks fulfill impor-
tant functions in this respect, but these functions could just as well be assumed by
other institutional investors. The goal of maintaining a flexible capital market can
justify, at best, only transitory holdings of shares [68]. And even that does not
justify the transformation of customers' bank deposits into participations by the
bank.
It is not surprising that the issue of participations has become a part of the dis-
cussiQn about banking reform, although until now no concrete measures have been
taken. From the outset it has been evident that this issue was not to be the crucial
test of a continuing system of universal banks. It has thus been treated separately,
or in connection with other factors relating to the banks' influence, such as deposi-
tory voting or personnel interlocks. On the other hand, it has never been proposed
that the acquisition of participations be absolutely prohibited. Its function in the
capital market is too useful to permit such a radical solution.
Several years ago there was discussion of the possibility of solving the problem
through divestiture of the banks' participations [69]. It would be a condition of
such divestiture that the banks thereafter could not exercise any influence over the
holding companies that would be created to facilitate the divestiture. But a transfer
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of participations to these holding companies, whose shares would be issued to the
shareholders of the banks, would create a considerable number of problems, both
economic and under corporate and tax law [70].
The only open issue in the current public discussion concerns limits on bank
participations. According to press reports such a measure is being considered by the
banks themselves by way of self-regulation. This discussion is being encouraged by
the recommendation of the Monopolies Commission, mentioned above, to limit
participations to 5% of the capital of any one corporation. The deliberations of the
Commission to Study Basic Issues in the Banking Sector are moving in the same
direction but are less far-reaching. Where should such a limit be drawn?
8. Proposals
The Monopolies Commission supports strict limits and does so despite the fact
that it is reacting only to the market effect of participations and not to the prob-
lems of protection of depositors. This position is grounded in the belief that a parti-
cipation of 5% facilitates access to normal banking business [71]. To preserve open
markets in the banking sector is the primary concern of the proposal.
Ownership of 5% of a company's capital stock does not permit direct influence
upon its decisions. It may nevertheless be the fact that such a connection may serve
to cement or intensify business relations in such a way that other banks are elimi-
nated as potential offerors of banking services. Such a limitation, which has the
effect of spreading the risk, can be an appropriate means of ameliorating the
security risk from the potential devaluation of participations. Banks must also be
considered, however, in their role as institutional investors. Their share participa-
tions are important factors in an efficient capital market. They act as intermediaries
between the multitude of small investors and the corporations and thereby support
the broadening of equity financing. If only temporary ownership of shares is per-
mitted, this role as intermediary is curtailed.
In France the ceiling on share participation by commercial banks was increased
from 10% to 20% in 1966/67 as part of a general program of promoting long-term
financing [72]. This was aimed at making a "transformation", to facilitate the
change from excessive savings to long-term risk capital [73]. In Belgium in 1975 the
same considerations led to the loosening of the ban on share participation by
administrative rule [74]. In Germany as well, this bank function should be con-
sidered in setting limitations to participations. From this standpoint a limit of 10%
seems appropriate. A more general allowance would be unacceptable, in view of the
consequent increased risk of loss from declining share values and the banks'
increased potential for influence over enterprises. Shareholdings permissible under
such a limitation would not reach up to the level permitted in France and Eire
[75]. But for an international comparison it should be recalled that in countries
with a system that separates commercial banking from investment banking, corn-
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mercial banks are normally forbidden to hold share participations.
Limiting the ownership of shares in any one company does not avoid the liquid-
ity risk connected with participations. It has been shown above that the use of
clients' funds for participations can endanger the liquidity that banks need. This
risk can be governed by varying the ratio between a bank's total shareholdings and
its equity. There are no absolute standards for determining this ratio. It seems sen-
sible, however, to allow banks to acquire participations only to the extent that they
can be covered by their equity (capital and reserves). Any further limitation does
not appear necessary, in view of the fact that bank equity in general is only a small
percentage of total banking assets. Furthermore, it should be noted that even with
funds on daily or short-term calls, a certain percentage will always remain with the
bank.
Setting a limit for participations that is not excessively low is meant to account
for the fact that shareholdings by banks financed from clients' funds deepen the
capital market and thus help meet the needs for equity financing by corporations.
Beyond this, from the point of view of the capital market, the ability of banks to
hold shares facilitates block trading and the placement of new issues. A further
justification for permitting participations is their use as replacements for loans that
companies in need of reorganization are currently unable to pay in cash. These
cases of block trading, new issues and loan replacements might require participa-
tions exceeding the general limits for a certain period of time. This could be pro-
vided for by a rule permitting shareholdings for up to one year and allowing exten-
sions [76]. To reduce the potential for influence from block holdings, holdings
exceeding 10% could be banned from voting; this would induce the sale of such
holdings. The need for the protection of investors would be provided for if, for
temporary holdings, a ceiling is fixed at 50% of the capital of a corporation.
9. Comparative survey
As already indicated above, such a limitation on participations by German uni-
versal banks would come close to the regulations in other European countries.
In Belgium, France and Italy, participations are regulated in the context of a
more or less distinct functional division within the banking system. There are no
universal banks; the banking laws make a fundamental distinction between deposit
banks for short-term business and investment banks concentrating on medium- and
long-term business. Under these circumstances the holdings of share participations
are to be found in the investment banks. The deposit banks are limited in their
ability to invest, although in these countries there is no absolute ban on share-
holding. In France a rather permissive regulation is in effect. Up to 20% of the
capital of a company may be acquired. However, the total of its participations must
not exceed the bank's equity [77]. In Italy investments by commercial banks are
severely limited. They are subject to the supervision of the Bank of Italy and must
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be notified. Permissions are granted for temporary investments and if distribution
to the investing public is intended [781.
Similarly considering the needs of the capital market, the ban on participations
in Belgium has been relaxed by law. Shares may remain in a bank's portfolio for up
to one year. However, the Commission Bancaire can extend this period. There is an
interesting exception, which exists only in Belgium, for acquisition that merely
serve to replace bad loans and are therefore meant to strengthen a corporation's
equity. As already mentioned, a further liberalization of the ban can be expected,
because the banking law, since 1975, permits participations within certain limits
that are to be defined by administrative rule in cooperation with the Commission
Bancaire [79].
In England the separation system has developed as a matter of tradition and is
not based on law. The Clearing Banks are engaged mainly in taking deposits and the
Merchant Banks in long-term industrial business. This is reflected in a concentration
of share portfolios in the Merchant Banks. An unwritten code of behavior, which is
now relaxing to a certain degree, is the principal barrier to participations by Clear-
ing Banks. Since 1972, however, this form of investment has been somewhat pro-
moted by the Bank of England, reflecting an increasing trend toward universaliza-
tion of the banking business [80]. The proposed enactment of a British banking law
will have to reveal how this problem should be solved.
Banks in Eire, Denmark and the Netherlands have the character of universal
banks. Nevertheless, shares cannot be held without limitation. Denmark has the
most extensive regulation. Since 1975 the Banking Law prohibits banks and savings
associations from engaging in business other than banking. This is meant to prevent
the exercise of control over other enterprises through participations. Majority hold-
ings are incompatible with this objective. The regulation is designed to eliminate
conflicts of interest between banks and business enterprises. For the same reason,
personnel interlocks are not permitted. Furthermore the Danish banking law pur-
sues banking objectives when it forbids a bank to acquire shares in any one enter-
prise with a book value in excess of 15% of the bank's equity. And the total
amount of share participations must not exceed 50% of the bank's equity [81].
In Eire the task of protecting depositors from excessive bank participations is
committed to the banking authority. In order to promote "orderly and proper
regulation of banking", the Central Bank, since 1971, has directed that, without its
permission, not more than 20% of the shares of another corporation can be
acquired. Obtaining permission is excused only where the value of the shareholdings
does not exceed 2% of the total of the bank's assets [82].
The Netherlands, a country with a typical universal banking system, has a gen-
eral regulation applicable only to savings associations, whose ownership of listed
shares may not exceed 50% of their equity. Participations by banks are dealt with
only indirectly in course of the Nederlandsche Bank's (Central National Bank)
supervision of mergers. They are sometimes granted under the condition that the
surviving bank may acquire participations only with the permission of the banking
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authority. This potential for control should not be underestimated, since there has
been a strong movement toward concentration in recent years. Furthermore, plans
in the Netherlands for a reform should be mentioned that would subject all acquisi-
tions exceeding 5% of the capital of any one company to an authorization [83].
A limitation on participations in Germany would therefore tend to fit into the
existing European framework, though significant differences in the laws of the
European Community are still existing. A harmonization is essential for an integra-
tion of the markets for banking services.
Share participations can result in competitive advantages. Influence over business
enterprises stabilizes and broadens the business relationships of a bank. This can
serve to eliminate foreign banks from competition for the business of enterprises,
at least if they do not themselves have participations. Harmonization of national
regulation would serve to equalize the conditions on the capital markets of the
member states, which in turn would promote a balanced development of a common
market for equity capital [84]. The European Commission has taken the first steps
toward harmonizing the laws in the banking section [85]; however, it will take
more time before a consensus will be achieved with respect to a Community direc-
tive including participatory investments of banks.
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